Reforming Redistricting

The Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC) has done a much better job since its creation in 2000 than the previous set-up, allowing the Arizona Legislature to create district lines for itself.

However, we need to make two crucial reforms to the system of choosing commissioners if we want to avoid the political political tampering that happens increasingly with each passing decade.

On December 22nd the five-member AIRC passed its final legislative and congressional maps, which will define our political landscape for the next 10 years.

Predictably, as a result of political tampering, the maps have shifted dramatically from the 2011 redistricting to favor Republican candidates in both the Legislature in Congress.

How we got here and how we fix it requires a brief look back.

A Little History

In 2011 the Republican Party in Arizona was convinced that the Democrats had rigged the decennial redistricting process.

Today the Democratic Party in Arizona is convinced that the Republicans have rigged the redistricting process.

Now both parties, and especially Independent voters, have an undeniable reason to enact two key reforms to the redistricting process: the two biggest weaknesses in the redistricting process could be exploited by either political party in the next round of redistricting in 2030.

The reforms I suggest also address the specific complaints that both parties, and independents, have had over the last two decades.

Increase the Number of Commissioners

First, we should increase the number of commissioners from 5 to 9, seating 3 Independents, 3 Republicans and 3 Democrats. The chair will still be an Independent chosen by the other commissioners.

However, having three Independents will virtually eliminate the incredible pressure of the political parties to find one linchpin Independent commissioner who will favor one side over another, as is the case now with only 5 commissioners.

Having a greater number of independents has worked better in other states, such as Michigan. That commission has 13 commissioners, 5 of which are Independents with 4 each from each major party.  

It is also fundamentally fairer to the increasing number of Independents in Arizona.

Restrict the Role of the CACA

Second, the role of the Commission on Appellate Court Appointments (CACA) should be restricted only to vetting the AIRC applicants to assure that they meet the requirements of the constitution.

For context, here is how it works now: people who would like to be AIRC commissioners must meet basic requirements. They submit their names to the CACA, which checks that they meet those requirements. Currently, the CACA then chooses a smaller number of applicants to forward to the leaders of both parties of the House and Senate for final appointment.

In my suggested reform, the applicant names that would be sent to the legislature for appointment should be drawn at random from the pool of vetted applicants. The legislative leaders would still have several applicants to choose from, as they have now. But the their choices will not have been unfairly restricted by a biased (and politically packed) CACA.

This reform eliminates the incentive for a partisan governor to stack the AIRC via the CACA. Whether you believe that the GOP did that in this round of redistricting or not, it is clear that the cat is out of the bag and the opportunity should be eliminated in the future so that neither party can do it.

While it seems quixotic to think that politicians, famous for waiting until the last minute to do anything, will act a decade ahead of the next redistricting, it is important to note that in each of the last two decades both parties actually did plan very far ahead in order to try to gain the upper hand in the up-coming process.

After feeling that they lost ground in the 2001 redistricting process, Democrats put a lot of energy in to preparing for the 2011 process, searching for commission candidates that would not make the same choices that were made in 2001.

After being convinced of the unfairness of the 2011 process, the GOP made it a priority to position allies on the CACA so that they could influence who would likely be the Independent commission chair.

In short, the aggrieved party will harness their resentment and direct it to the next round of redistricting. The biggest losers will always be Arizona voters who have always wanted a process that minimizes political games.

It is a truism in any political system that the longer that system is in place without necessary reforms, the greater the opportunity for politicians to rig it. These two simple reforms will go a long way to make a more tamper-proof redistricting process.

A Comment on Competitiveness

Those of you who know me know that I worked for many hears to require the commission to make a greater number of competitive districts. Philosophically, I believe that we all do better when there are more competitive districts, once we meet the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.

I could speak for an hour on why and how we could do that. However, I’m practical. It is more likely that a compromise, like I recommend above, could be referred to the ballot by the Legislature, and is not likely to be successful as an initiative.

I know. I tried in 2008.

As such, I think that the most likely scenario would be a referendum to close the existing loopholes from the very political parties that I hope will see this as their best interest.

Don’t get me wrong. If you know any billionaires who are willing to drop about $10 million on a ballot measure, please send them my way.

Until then, we can still do better.